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Abstract. In this article, we propose an agent-based model of opinion diffusion and voting
where agents influence each other through deliberation. The model is inspired from social
modeling as it describes a process of collective decision-making that iterates on a series of
dyadic inter-individual influence steps and collective deliberation procedures. We study the
evolution of opinions and the correctness of decisions taken within a group. We also aim
at founding a comprehensive model to describe collective decision-making as a combination
of two different paradigms: argumentation theory and agent-based influence models, which
are not obvious to link since a formal translation and interpretation of their relationship is
required. From a sequence of controlled simulations, we find that deliberation, modeled as
an exchange of arguments, reduces the variance of opinions and the number of extremists,
as long as not too much deliberation takes place during the decision-making process. Insofar
as we define “correct” decisions as those whose supporting arguments survive deliberation,
promoting deliberative discussion favors convergence towards correct decisions.
Keywords: Opinion diffusion · abstract argumentation · agent-based modeling · deliberation
1 Introduction
In a group, opinions are formed over affinities and conflicts among the individuals that compose
it. Axelrod [3], a pioneer in opinion dynamics, shed light on two key factors required to model
the processes of opinion diffusion, namely, social influence (i.e., individuals become more similar
when they interact) and homophily (i.e., individuals interact preferentially with similar others). He
showed that interactions through those factors lead to emergent collective opinions of which the
individual had poor control. Since, a growing body of research has endeavored to identify the con-
ditions under which social influence, at the micro (dyadic) level, translates into macro patterns of
diffusion through repeated iterations [26]. Two types of models appear in the literature: on the one
hand, the Ising-type models where opinions take discrete values [3,15]; on the other, the continuous
opinion models where opinions are represented by real numbers [10,25,18,30,19].
The question of group deliberation, defined as an exchange of arguments, is not explicitly taken into
account in opinion diffusion. Opinion dynamics seem to miss the intuition that individual behavior
may be determined by factors related to non-dyadic channels of interaction, such as deliberation
arenas, and to the structure and size of the channels of communication themselves. When a group
engages in a discussion, group size, what arguments are advanced, how discussion is organized over
time, and the acceptability criteria for proposals may lead to a transformation of preferences [17]
and play a crucial role in consensus formation [28,20,13]. Moscovici and Doise [20] explain that there
are two types of “discussions” in deliberation, informal or warm and formal or cold, that potentially
lead to consensus. They show that when a group is asked to reach an agreement through informal
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or non-procedural deliberation, the obtained consensus is more likely to be extreme compared to
the average of the pre-consensus individual opinions. When deliberation is procedural, the obtained
consensus tends to be milder and opinions less polarized. Opinion diffusion has also been used to
track convergence towards “correct” opinions. For example, authors in [22,16] study network effects
and signaling, but not deliberative protocols. A correct decision corresponds to one derived from a
state of the world in which all arguments for and against the decision are taken into account [8].
Deliberation reveals such arguments. Hence, it may help a group converge towards correct decisions.
For this reason, decision-making processes with deliberation are interesting to explore.
The aim of our model is to breach the gap between deliberation and opinion diffusion. Draw-
ing from [20], we model warm discussion using an opinion diffusion model based on social judg-
ment theory [27,18], and cold discussion using abstract argumentation theory [12,7]. We engineer a
decision-making process with voting that terminates according to deliberated decisions, as we draw
inspiration from the literature in deliberative democracy [13,8,28] and opinion diffusion [10,25,30].
We describe the effects of deliberation on opinions and on the correctness, a group’s ability to cor-
rectly judge propositions, and coherence, a group’s ability to accept deliberated proposals, of group
decisions by modeling decision-making processes as a sequence of deliberative and dyadic interac-
tions among agents. In particular, we study the impact of the frequency of deliberative interactions
and their construction (number of agents, voting rules, etc...) on opinions.
Our model shows that deliberation has a significant overall impact on the distribution of opin-
ions (variance) and on the overall shifts of opinion. We provide evidence of Moscovici and Doise’s
[20] results on consensus: when specifying opinion dynamics as only deliberative, the proportion
of extremists and the variance of opinions are lower than in a non-deliberative specification of the
dynamics. However, as observed in [28], if deliberation is mandatory in decision-making processes,
more deliberation translates to an increase in the variance of opinions and of the proportion of
extremists. The model also explains that the frequency of deliberative interactions as well as the
number of agents that participate in deliberation increase judgment accuracy in a marginally de-
creasing fashion, but have little to no effect on coherence in the decision-making process. Last, we
point out that results are strongly conditioned to the voting majority quota and to how agents
advance arguments during deliberation.
The remainder of this paper goes as follows: in section 2, we present the model, provide the neces-
sary basics to understand its implementation, and we introduce the metrics of interest. In section
3, we report and discuss our results; sections 4 and 5 are dedicated to related works and to the
conclusion of the article.
2 A model for collective decision-making with deliberation
Let N be a group composed of |N | = n agents. The group faces the question of whether to accept
or reject a proposal P justified by an argument I. I, or proposal argument, is judged on how well it
supports a principle P or its opposite ¬P. Agents discuss the proposal on the basis of their adherence
to the principle P. When agents discuss informally, they are subject to random pair-wise influence;
when they argue formally, they are impelled by the results obtained in the decision-making process.
A decision-making process D(P, I) on a proposal P is a sequence of formal and informal discussions
that leads to a decision on the acceptance of P (Fig. 1). A proposal P is accepted if the argument
I that justifies it is accepted in deliberation and/or voted favorably by a majority of agents.
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Fig. 1: A decision-making process D(P, I). d stand for informal discussion steps, d for deliberative
interaction, and V to a vote over I. Agents update their opinions according to the obtained result.
2.1 Deliberative agents and opinion dynamics with deliberation
Every agent i has an opinion, a relative position or degree of adherence oi ∈ [−1, 1] to the principle
P and a couple (Ti, Ui) ∈ [0, 2] × [0, 2] (Ui ≤ Ti) of latitudes of rejection and acceptance, respec-
tively, of informational cues. The idea is that there exist levels of relative tolerance from which
informational cues have either an attractive or a repulsive effect on the individual [27]. An oi close
to 1 implies that agent i fully supports the principle P, close to -1 that she rejects principle P or,
equivalently, fully supports ¬P.
Let A be a finite set of arguments, seen through the principle P, that agents may hold in a debate
over a proposal P. Each agent i has a sack of arguments Ai ⊂ A whose content reflects her relative
position, oi, on P. Thus, agents possess partial knowledge on the relationships between the argu-
ments in A. If a ∈ Ai, then agent i knows which arguments are in conflict with a. Each argument
a ∈ A is given a real number va ∈ [−1, 1] that stands for how much a respects or supports the
principle P. va = 1 means that argument a is totally coherent with the principle P, whereas va = −1
reads “argument a is totally incoherent with the principle P”.
Agents have an incentive to deliberate because they know that deliberation is an opportunity
to either support or undermine a proposal that opposes their position on P. They may present two
types of behavior, naive and focused. Naive agents will only use deliberation to voice their opinions
on the principle. Focused agents strategically argue in favor of proposal arguments that support
the principle they favor, thus using all the information they have on the relationship between ar-
guments. All agents (1) are able to assess the degree of support for P of all arguments, (2) agree
on the existence of a conflict between any two arguments if such is announced during deliberation,
and (3) are sincere when communicating their positions to each other. At time t, an agent i votes
favorably for a proposal P of justification argument I if and only if vI(t)× oi(t) ≥ 0.
A dynamics for informal discussion At each informal discussion time step t, every agent i
randomly meets one other agent j and updates her opinion according to the following dynamic
equation:
oi(t+ 1) =

oi(t) + µ(oj(t)− oi(t)) if |oi(t)− oj(t)| < Ui
oi(t) + µ(oi(t)− oj(t)) if |oi(t)− oj(t)| > Ti
oi(t) otherwise
(1)
where the parameter µ ∈ [0, 12 ] controls for the strength of attraction and repulsion in social influence
and (Ti, Ui) is the couple of latitudes of rejection and acceptance for informational cues of agent i.
The meeting and updating of opinions in this situation are loosely associated to Moscovici and
Doise’s warm discussion [20] and will be denominated the warm discussion model.
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a b c I
Fig. 2: Argumentation framework AF = (A,R) with A = {a, b, c} and R = {(a, b), (b, c), (c, I)}.
The labeling {{c}, {I}, {a, b}} is conflict-free, a and b are undecided, c is accepted and I is rejected.
{{a, c}, {b, I}, ∅} is the only complete labeling obtained from the framework.
2.2 Abstract argumentation and deliberative models for collective decision-making
Deliberation, defined as an exchange of arguments, may be modeled by confronting, eventually
contending, arguments. Following Dung’s abstract argumentation theory [12], let A be a finite set
of arguments and R a subset of A×A called attack relation. (a, b) ∈ R stands for the fact that
argument A attacks argument b, meaning that argument a is in conflict with argument b. One says
that an argument c defends an argument a if there exists b such that (c, b) ∈ R and (b, a) ∈ R. One
names argumentation framework (AF ) the couple (A,R) composed of a set of arguments and their
attack relation, which can be seen as a digraph in which the nodes are the arguments and the arcs
are the attacks. A label Lab(a) ∈ {IN,OUT,UND} of an argument a ∈ A denotes the acceptability
status of a in a deliberation process. Intuitively, an argument is labeled IN if it is acceptable,OUT if
it is not and UND, if nor IN nor OUT labels are applicable. Moreover, one defines a labeling on an
argumentation framework AF = (A,R) as a complete function L : A → Λ = {IN,OUT,UND},
a 7→ Lab(a) that assigns a label to each argument in AF . A labeling-based semantics is a set of
criteria that yields acceptable labelings. For example, if an argument a attacks an argument b, then
an acceptable labeling should not assign the label IN to both arguments. Basic semantics demand
labelings to be conflict-free, meaning that no two arguments that attack each other are labeled IN,
or admissible, implying that the labeling is conflict-free and that for any IN labeled argument a,
there exists another IN labeled argument c such that c defends (or reinstates) a.
The family of admissibility-based labelings goes from complete labellings, which are admissible
labelings for which all labels (including the undecided) are justified [5], to preferred and grounded
labellings which are complete labellings obtained from, respectively, maximizing and minimizing the
number of arguments that are labeled IN. They capture properties such as credulity and skepticism
in argumentation. For a more extensive account of semantics and labellings, refer to [5].
The reason why we incur to abstract argumentation is technical in nature. The theory provides
a comprehensive formalism that bypasses difficulties related to the nature and construction of ar-
guments. The formalism also lends itself well to graph theory and to model (collective) reasoning
in a clear, coherent and easy way [29]. Given an argumentation framework, Dung’s extension-based
[12] approach is only interested in the set of acceptable arguments (according to a certain seman-
tics). The labelling approach [7] assigns a label to each argument in the framework. Hence, this
approach is more expressive since it distinguishes arguments that are not accepted from those that
are undecided. Such distinction is crucial since the existence of undecided arguments is one of the
reasons why deliberation takes place and carries on over time. This is the primary justification for
using labeling-based semantics in our model. Figure 2 provides an example of an argumentation
framework that models one “step” of deliberation over a proposal justified by an argument I.
Deliberative collective decision-making protocol. Debates take place on a table in which a
central authority (CA) [6] fixes the deliberation procedure. The CA chooses the percentage of agents
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(nD) from the population that may actively participate in the deliberation, the labeling-based
semantics (σ) used to assess the label of the proposal argument, and the number (m) of debates
that ought to take place before a decision is deemed sufficiently discussed. Additionally, it also
controls the maximum number (m) of debates that can take place before abandoning deliberation,
and the number (tD) of informal discussion steps between debates. The CA also decides which
collective decision rules to apply during the process (e.g. whether there is voting on proposals) and
the proportion (α) of favorable votes in the population necessary to accept a proposal. Given a
proposal P, the deliberation or debate protocol goes as follows:
1. The CA generates and makes public a central argument or proposal argument I 6∈ A;
2. The CA randomly draws two sets of nD2 × n agents with divergent views on P;
3. Each agent advances an argument from her sack Ai. The CA makes sure that there are no re-
peated arguments with respect to previous debates on the same proposal (tables have memory);
4. The CA builds the debate’s argumentation framework on the previously held debates over the
proposal. It computes a labeling for the arguments using the semantics σ;
5. If the obtained label for I is undecided (Labd(I) = UND) or the number of debates steps held
in the decision process is inferior or equal to m at time t, then the CA stops the debate and
resumes it at the (t+ tD + 1)’th time step, by repeating 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5;
6. Let Lab(I) be the final label given to the proposal argument I. If voting is not part of the process
(α = 0), Labd(I) = Lab(I); otherwise if more than α × n agents agree with I, I is accepted
(Lab(I) = IN), refused if strictly less than α×n agents agree with it (Lab(I) = OUT). If there
is a tie Labd(I) = UND⇒ Lab(I) = OUT and Labd(I) = IN⇒ Lab(I) = IN.
Notice that deliberation always ends: either agents debate and agree on the proposal’s acceptability
through procedural argumentation or, after m debate steps, they directly vote on it. Also, observe
that voting for a proposal is the same as voting for the argument that justifies it.
2.3 Linking deliberation and informal discussion through opinions
Let P be a proposal, vI(t) the proposal argument I’s level of support for a principle P and oi(t) an
agent i’s opinion at time t. Then, given the distance δi(t) = 12 |vI(t) − oi(t)| and the acceptability
status Lab(I) of I at the end of a decision process over P, agent i updates her opinion as follows:
oi(t+ 1) =

oi(t) + γ(vI(t)− oi(t)) if Lab(I) = IN, with probability pδi(t)a
oi(t) + γ(oi(t)− vI(t)) if Lab(I) = IN, with probability p
1
δi(t)
r
oi(t) if Lab(I) 6= IN, with probability 1− p
1
δi(t)
r − pδi(t)a
, (2)
where γ ∈ [0, 12 ] is the strength of repulsion and attraction in the dynamics. pa and pr are probability
parameters that control for the possibility that an agent is attracted to and repulsed from agreements
reached during debates. The equation combines the probabilistic nature of the effect of deliberation
based on a principle similar to the one in social judgment theory [27], be it a moderating [20,13]
or polarizing [28] one. It follows that deliberated informational cues may potentially influence any
agent in the group. We call the model in which agents only update their opinions by Equation 2
the cold discussion model, as we associate it to Moscovici and Doise’s [20] cold discussion. We call
the mixed discussion model the model defined by Equations 1, 2 and the decision-making protocol.
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2.4 Simulations
A time step in the model corresponds to either a debate, a step of dyadic social influence or a vote
that makes agents update their opinions1. Simulations stop once 100 decision-making processes
over 100 randomly generated proposals terminate. We observe how deliberation affects opinion
distributions, coherence between majority voting and deliberative results, and judgment accuracy
taking as reference the warm and cold discussion models.
Observations. At the end of each simulation (t = S), we observe the following metrics:
- Variance of opinions (V ar(o)): the variance of opinions at time S. The higher the variance
of the distribution, the more “diverse” opinions are in the opinion pool;
- Shift in opinions (Sh) [9]: statistic that measures the aggregated change in individual opinion
at time S with respect to time 0, Sh = 2
∑
i∈N |oi(0)−oi(S)|
maxi∈Noi(0)−mini∈Noi(0) ;
- Proportion of extremists in the population (propex): percentage (%) or proportion of
agents in the population with non-moderate opinions (i.e. |oi(S)| ≥ 0.75);
- Judgment or consensual inaccuracy (ec): it consists of an ad hoc statistic measuring a
group’s ability to infer correct labels for proposal arguments. Correct labels are obtained from
the argumentation framework AFε that contains all arguments and their attacks. Let I be the
set of all discussed proposal arguments up to S and Labε(I) the label given to I in AFε. We use
a Hamming-based distance on labellings as introduced in [2] to explicitly define the statistic:
ec = 1| I |
∑
I∈I aI | Labε(I) 6= Lab(I)|, where aI = 12 if Labε(I) = UND or Lab(I) = UND and
aI = 1, otherwise;
- Coherence (ir): let Labd(I) be the label obtained for I from the deliberation process without
voting. The coherence statistic measures how well voting results adjust to results obtained
during deliberation: ir = |{I∈I |Labd(I)=IN,Lab(I)=IN}||{I∈I |Labd(I)=IN}| .
Initialization. All agents start off with an opinion oi drawn from a uniform distribution U(−1, 1).
For all agent i, we set (Ui, Ti) = (U, T ) for some (U, T ) ∈]0, 2[×]0, 2[, µ to 0.1 and pr to 0.05. Given
oi, agents randomly draw a set Ai (|Ai| = k) of arguments from a balanced2 argument pool A of
m = 600 non-neutral arguments on the basis of oi. Each argument a ∈ A is given a level of support
for the principle P, va, obtained from a uniform distribution U(−1, 1). The attack relation R that
gives birth to the consensual argumentation framework AFε is established according to the vas
and is given a permanent labeling Lσε computed using σ = grounded semantics. On the proposal
side, we create an argument I 6∈ A whose support for P is also drawn from a uniform distribution
U(−1, 1), and is given the label Lab(I) = UND. We allow I to attack no argument, yet allow other
arguments to randomly attack it. Finally, we set the maximum number of debates to m = 7 and
following [18], we set the number of agents in the model to 400.
3 Simulation results
We obtain two kinds of results. The first is global and answers the question on how deliberation
affects opinion formation. It consists of the comparison between the warm (Eq. 1), cold (Eq. 2),
1 In warm discussion, agents vote for the proposal arguments, but do not update their opinions.
2 By balanced we mean with as many arguments with va < 0 as with vb > 0.
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Length of DI Decisional in DI Social influence Deliberation influence Cognitive
tD m nD α T U pa γ k focused
{1,3,6} {1,3,6} {0.01,0.02,0.05} {0, 1
2
, 2
3
} {1.4,1.8} {0.2,0.6} {0.1,0.3,0.5} {0.05,0.1,0.2} {4,8,16} {True, False}
Table 1: Multimodal parameter domains used to compare warm, mixed, and cold discussion.
Fig. 3: From left to right, opinion trajectories and distributions for warm, mixed, and cold discussion.
Model
Metric
V ar(o) propex Sh ec ir
Warm vs. Cold discussion [0.191,0.216] [0.170,0.197] [-29.48,-28.28] [0.074,0.082] [0.165,0.172]
Mixed vs. Cold discussion [0.142,0.147] [0.150,0.155] [-20.85,-19.76] [0.003, 0.002] [-0.038,-0.030]
Mixed vs. Warm discussion [-0.072,-0.046] [-0.045,-0.018] [8.332, 8.859] [-0.079,-0.071] [-0.205,-0.201]
Table 2: Mean difference 0.95 confidence intervals for metrics by model comparison.
and mixed (Eq. 1, Eq. 2 w. deliberation protocol) discussion models. We simulate from 10 to 30
runs for each model and scenarii on the parameter space induced by the initialization and Table 1.
The second kind of results consists of a sensitivity analysis. It addresses the questions regarding
the importance of procedural deliberation parameters, namely nD, tD, α, andm, and agent behavior
on our metrics in the mixed discussion model. We span their domain as described in Table 3, and
generate 36,000 observations. Simulations and analyses are performed in Netlogo 6.0.4. and R 3.2.3.
Comparing the different models. From the simulations, we observe that the variance of opinions
and the proportion of extremists are strongly correlated (ρ ≈ 0.95, p < 0.001). We infer that
cold discussion favors judgment accuracy, reduces the variance of opinions and the proportion of
extremists. Although there is opinion polarization, only one group of extremists forms, probably
the one in favor of the first deliberated results (see Fig. 3). Otherwise, a moderate consensus around
neutrality forms. Warm discussion, on the other hand, is responsible for an increase in the variance of
opinions and in the number of extremists. Coherence is maximal since agents only vote for proposals.
Interestingly, we see that the mixed model is a compromise of the warm and cold discussion models.
Deliberation not only contributes to obtaining correct answers but also to a slight decrease in the
variance of opinion and in the proportion of extremists. However, it does not do better than the
cold discussion model on coherence and produces less shifts of opinion.
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Procedural parameters of interest Other parameters
tD m nD α focused m T U pa pr γ k
{1,2,...,6} {1,2,...5} {0.01,0.02,...,0.05} {0, 1
2
, 2
3
} {True, False} {7} {1.6} {0.2} {0.3} {0.05} {0.2} {12}
Table 3: Domains and types for procedural and behavior parameters in sensitivity analysis.
A first reading of the result concludes that there is a trade-off between judgment accuracy and
variance in opinion which may be interesting to explore. More accuracy is related to slightly less
extremism, which points to the fact that extremism may not contribute to successful deliberation.
Minimum number of debates (m). We observe that minimum number of debates has a sig-
nificant, well-observed effect on all of our metrics excluding coherence (ir). Taking variance of
opinions, we notice that the more debates there are, the bigger the value of the metric is, and the
higher nD and tD are, the weaker is the overall effect (Fig. 4d and Fig. 4a). Moreover, the marginal
increase of the minimal number of debates on the variance of opinions is decreasing. In contrast,
shifts in opinion are less and less likely as m grows and this independently of other parameters.
Again, the effect is marginally decreasing and is only truly significant when α = 12 . An explanation
of these effects may be linked to the design of the system. First, variance of opinions are higher
when deliberation is asked for because the more deliberation steps there are the higher the chances
that the proposal argument is deemed unacceptable. Mechanically speaking, increasing the mini-
mal amount of debates implies that whenever a decision is to be taken at least m× tD time steps
have to take place, and if an argument is considered undecided, tD time steps are added to the
process. So, unless the debate yields decisive labels for proposal arguments (less likely considering
that σ = grounded semantics), more non-deliberation steps take place in the decision process and
the higher the variance of opinions will be. Concerning shifts, when α 6= 12 , either the system is too
stiff to accept any proposal argument, and opinions do not change much, or the effects of pair-wise
discussion and deliberation cancel out in the process (Fig. 4b).
On the side of labeling-based metrics, the more debates are asked for, the more accurate a group
is in its judgment—the effect being smaller as m grows. When agents are naive, the effect is more
linear; when they are focused, the strongest effects of adding more deliberation are found when levels
of deliberation are already low (Fig. 4f). This can be explained by the fact that the more debates
there are in the decision process, the closer one gets to the consensual argumentation framework.
The effect is stronger for the focused agents because, when reconstructing the framework, they take
into account the deliberated proposal and advance the most pertinent arguments they have.
Proportion of the population in deliberation steps (nD). Like with m, nD has a significant
effect on the proportion of extremists and on the variance and shift of opinions (Fig. 4e). This
may result from the fact that being able to put more arguments in play at the same debate step
can increase the chances of revealing the cycles around the proposal argument. Given that we use
grounded semantics, the arguments in the cycles are labeled UND postponing debates more often
than if nD was lower. Postponing debates, in turn, increases the number of informal interactions in
the decision process, which increases the variance in opinion and limits the effect of deliberation.
Moreover, the effect of this parameter is very dependent on the value of α (Fig. 4e). For shifts,
for instance, α = 12 makes the effect of nD negative, while α = 0 makes it positive to a lesser
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Fig. 4: Curves of mean observations for 36,000 runs on metrics (0.95 confidence intervals).
degree. For higher requirements for deliberation (m), adding more individuals to the deliberation
process has weaker effects on the variance of opinions and on the other metrics. It is also quite
interesting to notice that it has the same effect on agents whether they are focused or not. This is a
surprising result as one would have expected more focused agents in an arena to heavily impact the
proportion of extremists. They play to knock out opposing proposal arguments and thereof hinder
the opinion-moderating effects of deliberation. Finally, similar to m, adding more people into the
deliberation process increases judgment accuracy (Fig. 4c) and has no effect on coherence (ir).
Steps between deliberation steps (tD). In all configurations, tD increases the proportion of
extremists (variance) and decrease the shifts in opinion. The shifts and the effect on the variance
of opinions are only observable for α = 12 (Fig. 4b). tD is highly linked to m by construction.
When m = 1, the curve linking the variance of opinions and tD is convex. As m increases, the
curve becomes more and more concave, which means that tD has a more important effect on the
opinion distribution as collective decision-making processes are longer. This seems counter-intuitive
yet it reflects the multiplicative relationship between deliberation and pair-wise interactions. If m
is low, and tD high, the effective number of pair-wise interactions are, on average, fewer in the
deliberation process, which limits the increase of the variance in opinions. Additionally, since the
grounded semantics yields few IN arguments w.r.t. other admissibility-based semantics, getting
closer to the consensual argumentation framework may lessen the number of opinion updates due
to deliberation. Last, a lower m makes deliberation more influential on opinions.
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Acceptability voting quota (α). By far, the most influential parameter in our study. It changes
the direction and the intensity of the effect of other procedural parameters and, by construction,
heavily constrains the road to accepting a proposal. In few words, α constrains the world to warm
discussion, or throws it into a process in which cold discussion is a lot more important. One either
gives too much weight to deliberated results (α = 0) and the effect of pair-wise interactions becomes
negligible, or too much weight to pair-wise interaction (α = 23 ). It follows that updates due to
deliberation happen rarely and opinions do not moderate. Concerning labeling-based metrics, α
entirely determines the coherence statistic. For α 6= 12 , there is no difference in coherence, because
of how coherence is defined: it is maximal when α = 0 and strangely maximal when α = 23 . The
reason for the latter is that latitudes of acceptance (rejection) are too low (high) and thus pair-wise
interactions are unable to unevenly polarize the population in such way that deliberated proposal
arguments are accepted by the two-third majority.
4 Related Work
We see our model as a contribution to the influence and opinion dynamics field in agent-based
modeling (ABM) and a pragmatic application of abstract argumentation theory. To our knowledge,
we are unaware of existing literature on ABM that explicitly relates collective decision-making,
deliberation by abstract argumentation, and opinion diffusion as we have done it. This said, many
models in the literature of opinion diffusion are interested in opinions because they influence collec-
tive decisions and can be used to reveal certain types of social phenomena. For instance, in [15] the
authors are interested in consensus and in how a group collectively decides on an action when it is
given two alternatives. In other models, authors are interested in the emergence of extremism [19]
and on the distribution of opinions when extremists are introduced in the population [10], while
other authors coin the notion of opinion polarization as an emergent property [19]. They show, using
models of “bounded confidence” and opinion diffusion with trust, that three different kinds of steady
states (unipolar, bipolar and central) were possible depending on whether agents were sufficiently
uncertain about their opinions, sufficiently connected, and/or a certain proportion of individuals
were already extreme. Similarly, work on collective cognitive convergence and opinion sharing [22]
show that consensus towards a certain opinion or cognitive state is always possible yet dependent on
noise, variability and awareness of agents. Closer to opinion formation and argumentation, authors
in [14] define an agent’s opinion as a function of the arguments she holds and their relationship
(logical). They device a peer-to-peer dialog system (NetArg) that uses only abstract argumentation
to study opinion polarization and opinion dynamics. When it comes to abstract argumentation
theory, we take an approach that wires two type of dialogues that are well-studied in the literature:
persuasion dialogues [21] and deliberation dialogues [1]. The line of work that might be closest to
ours is the one on mechanism design [23], or the problem of devising an argumentation protocol
where strategic argumentation has no benefit. We tackle mechanism design in a different way. In-
stead of considering strategy-proofness, we are interested in how differences in protocol can result
in “better” collective choices and guarantee that opinion distributions are favorable for deliberation
(“reasonable” level of variance). For a survey on persuasion dialogue, see [21].
Work on agent-based argumentation usually assumes that the semantic relationship between
arguments is fixed [23,24]. Other models which do not make this restrictive assumption can also
be found in the literature and derive from the class or family of opponent models [6] in which
two opposing sides attempt to win the dialogue. Our model is in the intersection of these, but the
framework that combines opinion diffusion of the kind and argumentation seems original.
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The idea of mixing interpersonal influence and vertical communication is not new. For instance,
[10] and [11] describe and implement such ideas in innovation diffusion. In both cases, vertical com-
munication is modeled as exogenous information. The originality of our work is in that information
emitted as vertical communication is endogenous. It is issued from a deliberation model that agents
shape on the basis of their opinions, arguments, and behavior. In the spirit of [4], where the au-
thors control for the design of vertical communication, we control for the process generating vertical
information.
5 Conclusion
The main objective of this article is to build a bridge in which decision-making, argumentation,
and opinion diffusion can meet. We propose a model that combines abstract argumentation theory
and a bounded confidence opinion diffusion model and showed to what extent it could explain
variability in opinion and correctness of collective decisions. The model reveals that (1) to ask for
more deliberation, (2) to allow for more agents to participate in deliberative instances, and (3) to
make deliberative interactions less frequent in time guarantees an increase in the variance of opinion
and in the proportion of extremists in a group. These results are consistent with results found in [18]
and in [17,28], which stress that deliberation may polarize groups and may have a meager effect on
shifts in opinion; and inconsistent with [13] where it is argued that deliberation moderates opinions.
Deliberation alone does moderate opinion as noted in [20] yet, when integrated into a complex
system in which individuals are allowed to interact with one another, its influence is overshadowed
by other individual-based dynamics. Undeniably, grounded semantics play an important role in the
weakness of the effect of deliberation since it models a skeptical way of reasoning over arguments.
Although accepting an argument happens less often, deliberation still increases judgment accuracy
in a marginally decreasing fashion. We show that voting within the deliberation protocol not only
increases the proportion of extremists and the variance of opinions but also determines how coherent
deliberation and voting are with one another. The most influential parameter found was the voting
quota for proposal acceptability because it determined which part of the mixed model (deliberation
if small, pair-wise influence if big) dominated the dynamics.
Extensions of this model include better-thought deliberation protocols where one may consider
deliberation as having only an impact on people that actually debate, and where observing how
deliberation changes opinion distributions equates to observing how it spreads within a group.
Taking into account trust, network effects, multi-dimensionality in opinions, new processes of argu-
ment exchange or learning are ways to further extend the model and relax unrealistic assumptions.
To conclude, exploring different argumentation ontologies and opinion dynamics and finding case
studies to apply the model are essential points to build on in future work.
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